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Extensive efforts have been made to understand the relationship between trade and technology 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1994).  Traditional trade models treat technology as exogenous and 
address how changes in technology affect trade pattern and welfare.  Recent research including 
new growth models have endogenized technology, which allows an examination of how trade 
affects the evolution of technology (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991).  Analytical 
studies show that international trade and capital flows serve as channels of international 
technological transfers.
1  That process, often referred to as technological convergence, enables 
countries to acquire advances in knowledge embedded in imported goods and capital inflows.  
Empirical work also has confirmed the significant contribution of trade and capital flows to 
technological convergence (Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister, 1997; 
Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison, 1997; Lichtenberg and Van Pottelsberghe, 1998; Keller, 2001).  
However, few studies have addressed the consequences of technological convergence for trade.  
In particular, the role and significance of technological convergence in production and trade 
patterns, and the consequent welfare of technological leaders and followers, have received 
limited attention.  In the present study, we analyze technological convergence and its 
consequences for processed food industries.   
Processed food represents a growing share of foreign trade.  Two-thirds of globally 
traded agricultural products, valued over $500 billion, undergo some form of value addition 
before shipment (Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, 2005).  Moreover, processed food industries have witnessed significant 
                                                 
1 Since knowledge is considered to be a nonrival good, its partial nonexcludability facilitates technological 
spillovers across countries depending on the volume of trade (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). 
  1multinational activity in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI), joint ventures, and licensing 
(International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, 2004).  The value of FDI, inward and outward, in the processed food sectors 
has more than tripled in the past few decades.  Studies of trade and FDI patterns have shown that 
technology is a key source of comparative advantage in the processed food industries, but that its 
level and growth rate exhibit significant cross-country variation (Trefler, 1993; Bernard and 
Jones, 1996a; Harrigan, 1997; Chan-Kang, Buccola, and Kerkvliet, 1999; Morrison Paul, 2000).  
Relative to other manufacturing industries, evidence of quick technological convergence in 
processed food is consistent with its growing trade volume and FDI activity (Bernard and Jones, 
1996a; Gopinath, 2003).  However, the impact of technological convergence on production and 
trade patterns, and the welfare of countries with advanced and less-advanced technologies, i.e., 
leaders and followers respectively, have received limited attention. 
In our study, we extend Krugman’s (1980) monopolistic competition model to allow for 
technological differences between two countries in the form of variations in fixed and marginal 
production costs.  Technological convergence is reflected in a narrowing inter-country gap 
between fixed or marginal production costs.  Comparative static analysis indicates that 
technological convergence raises the follower’s relative wage and global production share.  The 
leader’s welfare unambiguously increases as technological convergence lifts its terms of trade, 
even in the absence of further technological progress.  However, the follower’s welfare depends 
on the relative strength of its enhanced technology and the decline in its terms-of-trade.   
The few analytical studies available on the impacts of technological convergence have 
shown mixed results regarding the gains and losses to leaders and followers (Baumol, Nelson, 
and Wolff, 1994).  For instance, Krugman’s (1990) technology-gap model suggests that the 
  2follower’s catch-up will raise its real wage, but the leader’s welfare may decline on account of 
terms-of-trade effects.  Samuelson (2004) argues that if a less-developed country improves its 
exporting sector’s technology, all countries would benefit from the increase in global output.  
However, if globalization improved a less-developed country’s technology in a good exported by 
the advanced country, the latter would lose due to falling terms of trade.  Bhagwati et al. (2004) 
counter Samuelson’s (2004) assertions by claiming that losses due to declining terms of trade 
will become less relevant when the gains from trade induced by factor endowment differences 
are increasingly replaced by gains from intra-industry trade.  Our own study on the welfare 
effects of technological convergence provides theoretical and empirical evidence of the gains 
from intra-industry trade. 
Data in our study cover 30 countries, including 10 developed and 20 developing 
economies, in 17 processed food industries based on ISIC (Revision 3) 4-digit classifications 
over the period of 1993 to 2001.  We implement a value-added function, allowing for country-, 
industry-, and time-specific effects to estimate empirical counterparts of technological levels and 
rates of change, i.e.,  total factor productivity (TFP) levels and growth rates, assuming variable 
returns-to-scale (Harrigan, 1999).  Technological or productivity convergence is identified 
through a regression of TFP growth rates on initial levels (β convergence) in each processed food 
industry (Bernard and Jones, 1996a).  For the industries with evidence of productivity 
convergence, we then estimate the welfare impacts of technological convergence, including the 
effects on the follower’s relative wage and share in global value added.  To our knowledge, this 
is the first study of cross-country TFP variations, convergences, and their effects at the 4-digit-
level food industry level, providing depth to the convergence literature.   
 
  3Conceptual Framework 
In this section, Krugman’s (1980) monopolistic competition model is extended by allowing for 
technological differences between two (groups of) countries to analyze the role of technological 
convergence in production and trade.  
Trade Between Countries with Different Technologies  
Each of the two countries, A and B, produces a series of potential goods in an industry under 
monopolistic competition.  Production uses only one factor – labor.  Unlike Krugman’s (1980) 
model, country A here has a technological advantage over country B, reflected by differences in 
labor requirements of production.  That is, the unit labor requirement of country A:  ii lx α β =+  
is less than that of country B: 
***
ii l
* x α β =+ , because 
* ,
* α αβ β < < , where α  (
* α ) and β  (
* β ) 
denote the fixed and marginal production cost of country A (B), respectively, and   ( ) denotes 




i x  (
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i x ) units of the i-th good in country A (B).  Under free trade, 
consumers in either country consume all varieties produced by both countries.  In this version of 
our technological-convergence model, transport costs are assumed to be zero. 
The representative consumer in country A maximizes his utility, which takes constant 
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where   denotes country A’s wage rate, and   denotes the price of the i-th good.  w i P
  4  Due to monopolistic competition, each good is produced by only one firm, and each firm 
produces only one good.  Therefore, the i-th firm’s profit is given as: 
(2)   ( ) ( ) iii i Pxx xw α β − + , 
where  i x  denotes the output of the i-th good.  Profit maximization requires: 
(3)   ' ii i Px P w β += , 
where  , the derivative of the i-th price with respect to its output.  In the long run, 
free entry brings profit to zero for each firm [setting equation (2) to zero].  
' / ii PP =∂ ∂ i x
In equilibrium, supply equals demand: 
(4)  
** , 1,..., iii x LC LC i n = +           = , 
(4’)  
** * , 1,..., iii
* x LC LC i n n n = +          = + + , 
where L is the labor force of country A, and the asterisk denotes the corresponding variable in 
country B.  Labor markets in each country also clear, where total labor supply equals the total 
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We follow the assumption of Krugman’s (1980) model that a large number of goods is 
produced (but is still less than the number of potential goods), so that the pricing decision of any 
one firm will have a negligible effect on the marginal utility of income.  In that case, each firm of 
either country faces a demand curve with a constant elasticity of 1/(1-θ), which, given equation 
(3), yields the equilibrium price of the i-th good produced by either country:  
(6)  
1
i Pw β θ
− = , 




− = . 
As  ,, w β θ  are common in country A, all goods produced by country A have the same prices, 
denoted by  , i.e.,  P
1
1 ... n PP P w β θ
− == == .  Similarly, the prices of good n+1 to good n+n
* in 
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From equation (1), we conclude that for either country, the representative individual 
consumes an equal amount of each domestically produced good and an equal amount of each 
imported good: 
(7)  
1/( 1) *1/( 1)
/( 1) * * /( 1) /( 1) * * /( 1) , ab
wP wP
CC
nP n P nP n P
θθ
θθ θθ θθ θθ
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/( 1) * * /( 1) /( 1) * * /( 1) , ab
wP wP
CC
nP n P nP n P
θθ
θθ θθ θθ θθ
−−
−− −− =        =
++
, 
where    and   denote country A’s individual consumption of each domestically produced 
good (  and each imported good  , respectively; and   and   
denote country B’s individual consumption of each imported good (
a C b C
1,..., ) i = n
n





1,..., ) i =  and each 
domestically produced good  , respectively. 
* ( 1,..., ) in nn =+ +
The zero profit condition generates the equilibrium output of each good: 
(8)   , 1,...,
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Equations (8) and (8’) indicate that goods produced within a country have identical output, 
which is determined by the country’s fixed and marginal costs.  We define the output of each 
country A’s good as x, and the output of each country B’s good as 
* x .  Moreover, equation (4),  
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Given the labor market-clearing conditions, the equilibrium number of varieties for each 


















The number of varieties in either country is determined by country size (L  or  ), fixed cost (
* L α  
or 
* α ) and the degree of substitutability, θ .  Country size affects the number of varieties 
positively, while fixed cost has a negative effect on it.  
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Likewise, country A’s exports (country B’s imports),  , is given by:   
**
a nPLC
(11’)    
/( 1) * *
** * *
/( 1) * * /( 1) * * a
nP wLw L
nPLC w L







Equations (11) and (11’) show that country A’s imports equal its exports so that the trade balance 
is zero.  In the following, we will denote exports or imports of either country as TR, i.e., trade.  
Technological Convergence 
As labor is the only factor of production, convergence in this model is based on labor 
productivity ( / x l  and 
** / x l ).  Technological convergence is reflected in a narrowing inter-
country fixed or marginal cost of production, i.e., the decline of 
* / α α  and/or 
* / β β .  The focus 
  7here is on a convergence of marginal costs, holding fixed costs constant.
2  
Now suppose that 
* β  approaches β  as follows: 





where I denotes the interaction between the two economies, and λ  denotes the rate of 
technological convergence in marginal costs.  The leader (country A)’s marginal cost (β ) is 
given, while that of the follower (country B)’s (
* β ) is endogenous in equation (12). 
Comparative statics on equation (12) suggests that the faster is the rate of technological 
convergence, the greater is the productivity in “catch-up” countries, that is, the lower is the 
marginal cost of the follower: 
(13)  
*









  Output: The output of each variety is determined by the country’s fixed and marginal 
costs.  When technology converges, the leader’s output will not change due to its constant fixed 
and marginal costs.  But the follower’s output of each variety will increase with the decline in its 
marginal cost.  As a result, the follower’s relative supply in the world market goes up, and global 
supply also rises. 
  Terms of Trade: From equation (9), a country’s terms of trade is negatively correlated 
with its relative output of each variety.  The expansion of the follower’s output reduces its terms 
of trade ( ), but raises that of the leader.  
* / PP
  Relative Wage: Country A’s relative wage with respect to country B is given as w/w*, 
which in equilibrium is determined by two countries’ marginal costs (β  and 
* β ), and the 
relative good price ( ).  From equations (6) and (6’),  
* / PP
                                                 
2 The assumption of constant fixed costs is reasonable if we assume the fixed costs are set-up so that technological 
progress only affects the marginal costs.  








From equation (9), the relative wage is determined by both countries’ fixed and marginal costs as 
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Since 
** , α αβ β << , 01 θ << , the leader’s relative wage is greater than unity, i.e.,  .  
In other words, workers in the leading country enjoy a higher wage rate. 
* (/ )1 ww >
Proposition 1.  Relative wage between two countries is directly proportional to relative 
productivity levels.  Technological convergence will lead to factor price equalization.  
Proof: As technology converges, the follower’s relative marginal cost declines, leading to an 
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where the hat indicates the proportional change of the corresponding variable (e.g.,  ).  In 
this setting, inter-country wage differences result from a technological gap, and technological 
convergence will thus shrink the wage gap across countries.  If the countries’ technological 
levels continue converging until they become identical, they will eventually reach the same wage 




Proposition 2.  Technological convergence will increase (decrease) the leader’s (follower’s) 
imported share of consumption. 
 
3 Note that complete factor price equalization requires convergence in both fixed cost and marginal cost.  However, 
convergence in marginal cost itself will reduce two countries’ technological gap and their wage gap.   
  9Proof: Country A’s imported share of consumption is given by  , the share of trade in its 
national income:  
/ TR wL
(15)  
** / (1 ) * *
/( 1) * * /( 1) * *
TR n P w L







Its proportional change is, 
(15’)  













=  is the ratio of country B’s national income to that of country A. 
The leader allocates its national income between the demand for domestic goods and that 
for imported goods.  Technological convergence boosts the follower’s output of each variety, 
and reduces its relative price, thereby leading to an increase in the leader’s relative demand for 
the follower’s products.  Note that technological convergence causes an increase in the elasticity 














) and, thus, an 
increase in the follower’s output of each variety.   With technological convergence, trade arises 
not only from consumers’ love-of-variety preference as in Krugman (1980), but also from scale 
economies and the resulting change in global output composition.  In contrast, country B’s 
imported share of consumption ( ) declines in response to technological convergence:   
** /( ) TR w L
(16)  











  Welfare: Due to the long-run zero profit condition, a country’s national welfare is based 
on changes in consumers’ utility.  We assume during the process of technological convergence 
that total labor force in both countries (L  and  ) is fixed, so that the change in a country’s 
* L
  10welfare is fully captured by the change in its representative individual utility.  In equilibrium, the 
indirect utility of country A’s representative individual is: 
(17)  
*
* / (1 ) ** / (1 ) 1 * / (1 ) 1 (,, ) ( ) () [ ( ) ]
wP
VwPP w n P nP n n
PP
θ θθ θθ θ θ θθ θ − −− −− =+ = + . 
Proposition 3.  Technological convergence will benefit the leading country by increasing its 
terms of trade, but its effect on the follower’s welfare depends on the relative strength of the 
follower’s enhanced technological level and the negative terms-of-trade effects.  
Proof: As indicated in equation (17), the change in country A’s individual utility is determined 
by changes in individual real income ( ), country A’s terms of trade ( ), and the 



















m n . 
Exogeneity of β  suggests constant real income of country A, and the assumption of constant 
fixed costs implies the constant numbers of varieties in both countries.  Therefore, the change in 
country A’s individual utility ( l V ) only results from the change in its terms of trade: 










As indicated above, the leader’s terms of trade goes up as technology converges; therefore, 
technological convergence improves country A’s welfare. 
The equilibrium indirect utility of country B’s representative individual is: 
(18)  
*
* * * * /( 1) * * /( 1) 1 * /( 1) 1
** (, ,) ( ) () [ () ]
wP
VwP P wn P n P n n
PP
θ θθ θθ θ θ θθ θ − −− −− =+ = + . 
Due to the constant numbers of varieties, the change in country B’s individual utility results from 
changes in individual real income and country B’s terms of trade:  












where the first term on the right hand side is the change in country B’s individual real income 
and the second term on the right hand side indicates the change in country B’s terms of trade.  
With technological convergence, country B is experiencing technological progress, leading to an 





> ).  If the positive income effect dominates the negative 
terms-of-trade effect, the second term on the right hand side of equation (18’), country B’s 
welfare will finally improve. Under the assumption of exogenousβ , equation (18’) becomes: 












That is, country B’s welfare will improve when technology converges. 
  In sum, technological convergence has a positive net effect on both the leader’s and the 
follower’s welfare.  Though the leader’s share in global production declines, it enjoys higher 
terms of trade from the follower’s catch-up.  The follower also benefits from its own 
technological progress due to increases in its real income and share of global markets.   
 
Empirical Framework for Technological Convergence 
We represent technology by total factor productivity, as estimated econometrically from 
industry-specific value added function (Bernard and Jones, 1996a; Harrigan, 1999; Miller and 
Upadhyay, 2002).  Details of TFP computation are presented in Appendix A.  The econometric 
approach allows for a variable returns-to-scale technology and monopolistic competition.
4  The 
approach also permits testing hypotheses on robustness of cross-country measures of TFP.  
                                                 
4 See Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982), Harrigan (1997) and Ball et al. (2001) for an index number approach 
to measure TFP. 
  12Moreover, the value-added specification is consistent with TFP convergence (or divergence) 
models (Miller and Upadhyay, 2002; Bernard and Jones 1996a; Baumol, Nelson, and Wolff, 
1994; Ark and Pilat, 1993).   
  With industry- and country-specific data on TFP levels in time series, we can explicitly 
measure the follower’s relative TFP with respect to the leader using their TFP ratios, and 
examine the industry-specific β -convergence by identifying the relationship between the 
followers’ relative TFP growth rates and their initial relative TFP levels.  More specifically,    
(19)   00 ln( ) ln( ) ci i i ci ci TFP D TFP δ δμ Δ= + + , 
where   denotes the average growth rate of country c’s productivity relative to the 
leader, country 1, in industry i over T periods;   denotes country c’s relative TFP level 
in industry i at the base year; 
ln( ) ci TFP Δ
0 ln( ) ci TFP
i δ  denotes the industry-specific slope of industry i; and   denotes 
the industry-specific dummy variables.  Using the followers’ TFP levels and growth rates 
relative to those of the leader will yield their “catch-up” speed toward the leader (Bernard and 
Jones, 1996a).  A negative coefficient (
i D
i δ ) on log of the initial productivity level indicates the 
growth rates of countries’ TFP are negatively correlated with their initial TFP levels, suggesting 
productivity convergence among countries.  Given the sample length T, the speed or rate of 
productivity convergence of industry i,  i λ , can be calculated using the coefficient,  i δ : 
(20)   .  [1 (1 ) ]/
T
ii T δλ =− − −
When 0 i λ > , provides an impetus for “catch-up” toward the leader: productivity differentials 
between two countries increase the relative growth rate of the country with lower productivity 
(Bernard and Jones, 1996a).  Therefore,  0 ln( ) ii c i DT F P δ  in equation (20) captures the portion of 
  13the followers’ TFP growth rates that are induced by their technological “catch-up”, while TFP 
growth caused by factors other than convergence can be measured by  0 ci δ μ + .   
 
Empirical Specification of Welfare Effects  
Decomposition of the followers’ TFP growth enables us to examine hypotheses on the effects of 
convergence on wage, production, and national welfare.  Proposition 1 shows that the wage gap 
between the leader and the follower is negatively affected by convergence.  Therefore, the effect 
of convergence on the follower’s relative wage is estimated controlling for factor accumulation 
as:   
(21)   123 4 ci ci ci ci c Wage TC TN Cap Edu γ γγ γ Δ= Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ  
where   denotes the average growth rate of country c’s relative wage in industry i over T 
periods;   (
ci Wage Δ
ci TC Δ 0 ln( ) ii c i DT F P δ ) and  ci TN Δ  ( 0 ci δ μ + ) denote TFP growth of country c in 
industry i induced by convergence and other factors, respectively; and  ci Cap Δ  and  denote 
the average growth rate of country c’s relative capital intensity in industry i and relative 
education level, respectively.  We expect the estimates of 
c Edu Δ
1 γ  and  2 γ  to be positive since faster 
TFP growth from convergence or otherwise will increase the follower’ relative wage.  Capital 
intensity positively affects the wage rate because marginal product of labor increases with the 
growth of capital-labor ratio.  Moreover, when educational levels increase, they tend to raise 
relative wages, so that the coefficient on  c Edu Δ ,  4 γ , is expected to have a positive sign.  
Controlling again for a country’s relative factor accumulation, convergence raises the 
follower’s production share in global markets but reduces that of the leader:   
(22)   123 4 ci ci ci ci ci ST CT N K SL S ϕ ϕϕ ϕ Δ= Δ + Δ + + Δ  
  14where   denotes the average growth rate of country c’s share in global value added in 
industry i over T periods; and   and 
ci S Δ
ci KS Δ ci LS Δ  denote the average growth rate of country c’s 
global capital and labor share, respectively, in industry i over T periods.  As before, we expect 
the estimates of  1 ϕ  and  2 ϕ  to be positive. 
  Recall that technological convergence has two opposite effects on the follower’s national 
welfare:  income (positive) and terms-of-trade (negative) effects.  To isolate these two effects on 
welfare, we employ a two-stage estimation.   The first stage is to separately estimate the impacts 
of convergence on the follower’s income and on its relative price.  From equation (21), the 
coefficient on   ( ci TC Δ 1 ˆ γ ) identifies the income effect of technological convergence.  For the 
terms-of-trade effect, data on domestic and foreign prices are not available.  However, we use the 
ratio of imports to domestic supply in national consumption,  ci IR , as a proxy of the country’s 
relative price.  Imports apply only to that from the leader and domestic supply in national 
consumption is defined as domestic output less exports to leader.  Therefore, the terms-of-trade 
equation is specified as: 
(23)   12 ci ci ci IRT CT N η η Δ= Δ + Δ  
where  ci IR Δ  denotes the average growth rate of the ratio of imports to domestic supply in 
national consumption defined using trade with the leader.  Since growth in the follower’s relative 
TFP negatively affects its relative prices, we expect estimates of both  1 η  and  2 η to be negative. 
  The second stage is to estimate the contribution of income and terms-of-trade effects to 
the changes in national welfare.  Welfare is represented by domestic absorption, defined as the 
sum of domestic output and imports from the leader less exports to the leader:    
(24)   12 ci ci ci RY Wagefit IRfit φ φ Δ= Δ + Δ  
  15where  ci RY Δ  denotes the average growth rate of domestic absorption of country c in industry i 
over T periods; and   and  ci Wagefit Δ ci IRfit Δ  are the respective fitted values of   and  ci Wage Δ
ci IR Δ  from equation (21) and (23), attributable to convergence.  Increases in relative wage and 




The United Nations Industrial Development Organization’s (UNIDO) Industrial Statistical 
Database (INDSTAT4 2005) provides cross-country data on manufacturing industry value added, 
employment, gross fixed capital formation, wages, and output.  Data on 17 processed food 
industries, based on ISIC (revision 3) 4-digit classifications in 30 countries from 1993-2001, are 
taken from INDSTAT4 (table 2).  Among the 30 countries, 10 are developed (Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, United States), and 20 are 
developing economies (Columbia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Jordan, Korea, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Oman, Panama, Singapore, 
Thailand, Turkey).  Some countries’ data are only available in selected years, so we use their 
data classified at ISIC revision 2 to complete the series.  Correspondence between ISIC revision 
2 and revision 3 for U.S. industries is from U.S. Bureau of Census, and we assume this 
correspondence is applicable to all countries.
5  As data availability varies across countries and 
industries, we have an unbalanced data panel.  Except that the employment data are expressed in 
                                                 
5 Data for some countries are available in both revisions in particular years, which enables us to test the average 
difference between the data reported in revision 3 and those converted to revision 3 from revision 2 using U.S. 
industry correspondence.  Results of t-tests indicate that none of data differences in value-added, employment, or 
gross fixed capital formation are significantly different from zero at 5% significance level, supporting our 
assumption that U.S. correspondence between two revisions can be applied to other countries.  
 
  16units, other production data are measured in current local currencies in INDSTAT4.  In order to 
make them internationally comparable, we fist convert cross-country and -industry data to 
constant 2000 local currencies by using their corresponding price index from 2005 World 
Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank, then convert them to constant 2000 U.S. dollars by 
using the purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factors from 2005 WDI.
6
  With data on annual gross fixed capital formation, we construct capital stock as a 
function of past investment flows, following the standard perpetual inventory equation with 
declining balance depreciation (Crego et al., 1998; Hall et al., 1988): 
1 (1 ) tt Kd K − =− + t I  
where  t I  is the gross fixed capital formation in year t,   is the capital stock at the end of year t, 
and   is the depreciation rate.  We follow Hall et al. (1988)’s procedure to solve the problem of 














0 t K  is the initial capital stock, 
0 t I  is the investment in base year (t0), and g is the 
presample growth rate of new capital per year.  Country-specific presample capital growth rates 
are derived as the average annual growth rate of gross fixed capital formation in the aggregate 
economy over the 10-year pre-sample period.  Data on annual gross-fixed-capital-formation 
growth rates are available in WDI.  We set depreciation rate ( ) at 8% per year.  Finally, the 
number of students enrolled in secondary education is adopted as a proxy of the country’s 
education level, whose data are taken from World Bank Education Statistics Database (EdStats).  
d
                                                 
6 Manufacturing value-added price index and output price index. are computed as the ratio of current to constant 
manufacturing value added; gross-fixed-capital-formation price index is computed as the ratio of current to constant 
gross fixed capital formation of the aggregate economy; and consumer price index (CPI) of the aggregate economy 
is used to deflate wages.  
  17 
Preliminary Results 
Results on TFP estimation, equation (A.5), are presented in table 1.  The coefficient on log of 
capital per unit of labor is significant at the 5% level, indicating that the capital elasticity of value 
added is 0.226.  The statistically significant coefficient on log of employment (-0.045) suggests 
that food industries exhibit decreasing returns to scale, albeit marginally.  Prior studies found 
mixed evidence on scale economy in food processing industries (Chan-Kang, Buccola, and 
Kerkvliet, 1999; Gopinath, 2003).  For instance, Chan-Kang, Buccola, and Kerkvliet (1999) find 
modest scale economies in the U.S. food processing industry, while Gopinath (2003) finds 
significant scale diseconomy in that of 13 OECD countries, both of which are at the aggregate 
level.  Moreover, our model is based on the “value-added” technology rather than the “gross 
output” technology, which excludes intermediates due to data limitations.  The coefficient on log 
of capital per unit of labor and that on log of employment combine to generate an implied 
elasticity of value-added with respect to employment of 0.729.  The latter result is consistent and 
indicates that processed food industries are labor intensive. 
  With the coefficients on log of capital per labor and log of employment, cross-country 
and -industry TFP are derived for each time period.  An F-test rejects the null hypothesis of 
identical technology across countries [F(29,2972), 148.55] at the 1% level.  Thus, TFP estimates 
show significant variation in levels and growth rates across countries, among which U.S. is the 
technological leader in 11 of 17 processed food industries.
7  Other leaders include Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, and Spain (Table 2).  The result that U.S. TFP levels are relatively higher in most food 
industries is consistent with the findings of other studies (Harrigan, 1997; Chan-Kang, Buccola, 
                                                 
7 Except ISIC 1542, U.S. production data are not available in time series in other five industries (ISIC 1532, ISIC 
1541, ISIC 1543, ISIC 1544, ISIC 1549) where U.S. is not the technological leader.  
  18and Kerkvliet, 1999; Gopinath, 2003).  However, because our results are based on four-digit 
industries, the United States may not necessarily be the productivity leader in specific subsectors 
(e.g., sugar), although its average productivity across all subsectors is higher than that in other 
countries.  
  Table 3 reports the results of β -convergence test of equation (19).  As indicated by 
convergence hypothesis, a negative coefficient on log of initial (relative) TFP level suggests 
productivity convergence.  Among 17 food industries, 13 of them, i.e., ISIC 1511, ISIC 1512, 
ISIC 1513, ISIC 1520, ISIC 1531, ISIC 1533, ISIC 1541, ISIC 1543, ISIC 1549, ISIC 1551, 
ISIC 1552, ISIC 1553, ISIC 1554, have a negative coefficient on log of initial (relative) TFP 
level that is at least significant at the 10% level.  That is, countries with relatively lower TFP 
levels tend to have a relatively higher TFP growth rate, which is evidence of their catch-up to the 
leader’s productivity, i.e., productivity convergence.  The convergence regressions explain about 
22.5% of the variation in TFP growth rates, which is not surprising since TFP growth is 
explained by a number of other factors, including R&D, technological opportunity, and 
appropriability conditions.  Given equation (20), we calculate rates of convergence for the 
thirteen industries with statistically significant evidence of productivity convergence.  The rate of 
convergence varies between 2.5% and 9.5% per year.  Findings of TFP convergence indicate the 
public-good nature of technology.  In comparison, Bernard and Jones (1996a) find that the speed 
of TFP convergence among OECD countries in agriculture and manufacturing to be 6.50% and 
1.68 % per year, respectively.  Different convergence rates in the two studies have several 
implications.  First, evidence of productivity convergence is stronger in recent years than before, 
and possible reasons include the development of information technology and the resulting deeper 
economic integration, i.e., globalization.  Second, a higher speed of global productivity 
  19convergence than that among OECD countries may indicate developing countries are 
experiencing faster “catch-up” toward the technological leaders than developed countries are.  
This finding reflects to some extent the arguments of Bernard and Jones (1996b) that they expect 
TFP convergence among the countries that are adopting existing technology but no convergence 
among the innovators.  Third, disaggregate food industries may exhibit stronger productivity 
convergence than the aggregate food industry does since “intra-industry” trade is accounting for 
an increasing share of global trade, which is accompanied by international technological 
transfers within industries. 
  Results on the wage effect of technological convergence are shown in table 4a, where 
coefficients on all the explanatory variables have the expected positive signs and are significant 
at the 5% level.  An 1% increase in the follower’s TFP induced by technological convergence 
will boost its relative wage by 0.26%, indicating technological convergence raises the follower’s 
relative wage level, consistent with our theoretical prediction.  The wage effect of TFP growth 
from other sources is slightly weaker, with an elasticity of 0.192.  The elasticity of the follower’s 
relative wage with respect to its relative capital intensity is 0.214, indicating higher capital 
intensity increases the relative wage rate by raising the marginal product of labor.  Among the 
explanatory variables, growth of countries’ relative education levels has the strongest impact on 
the growth of their relative wages with the coefficient of 0.298.  The regression of equation (21) 
explains about 26.7% of the variation in growth rates of the followers’ relative wage.   
  Table 4b reports results of productivity convergence’s effect on the followers’ global 
value-added shares (equation, 22).  Coefficients on all the explanatory variables are positive 
again, and significant at the 5% level, consistent with our expectations.  Here, an 1% increase in 
the follower’s TFP from technological convergence will increase its global value-added share by 
  200.986%, suggesting the follower’s share in global value added grows faster when technological 
convergence is stronger.  The effect of TFP growth due to other factors is also significant, with 
an elasticity of 0.867.  Variations in both global capital share and global labor share affect the 
growth in global value-added share positively.  But the effect of capital growth is modest, with 
an elasticity of 0.235 while the effect of labor growth is more significant with an elasticity of 
0.833.  Effects of TFP growth from both technological convergence and non-convergence 
sources are greater than those of variations in capital share and labor share, suggesting TFP is 
relatively more important than factor accumulation in determining a country’s competitiveness in 
global markets.  Regression of equation (22) explains 92.5% of the variation in growth rates of 
the followers’ global value-added shares.  Both table 4a and 4b show the coefficient on TFP 
growth from technological convergence is greater than that on TFP growth due to other factors.  
This finding indicates that technological “catch-up” is a key determinant of the follower’s global 
competitiveness, reflected by its relative wage and global production share. 
  In sum, regressions of wage effect and value-added effect suggest technological 
convergence increases the follower’s relative wage and its global production share, which 
confirms our theoretical predictions that technological convergence will enhance the follower’s 
competitiveness in the world market.
8   
 
Conclusions 
In this study, we investigate the welfare effects of technological convergence in food industries.  
We extend Krugman’s monopolistic competition model to allow for technological differences 
between two countries.  Technological convergence is reflected in a narrowing inter-country gap 
between fixed or marginal production costs.  Comparative static analysis indicates that 
                                                 
8 Welfare equations (equation (23) and (24)) have not been estimated since trade data are unavailable at present.  
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technological convergence raises the competitiveness of the follower nation, as reflected in its 
share of global production, but weakens that of the leader.  However, the leader’s welfare rises as 
technological convergence raises its terms of trade.  The follower’s welfare depends on the 
relative strength of its enhanced technological level and the decline in its terms-of-trade gains. 
  Empirically, data on 30 developed and developing countries in 17 processed food 
industries are assembled to estimate cross-country and –industry TFP levels and rates of growth 
through a value-added equation.  TFP estimates indicate significant variation in levels and 
growth rates of productivity across countries.   Technological convergence is identified through a 
regression of relative TFP growth rates on initial relative TFP levels in each food industry.  In 
thirteen out of seventeen food industries, we find evidence of technological convergence.   
  For the thirteen industries with technological convergence, we then decompose TFP 
growth into that from technological convergence and other factors.  Welfare equations from the 
theoretical analysis guide specifications to estimate the effects of convergence on the followers’ 
relative wages and global value-added shares.  We find a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between followers’ relative wages (shares in global value-added) and technological 
convergence.  The latter confirms that technological convergence increases followers’ welfare 
and competitiveness in global markets. 
Our investigation of technological convergence and its welfare impacts contributes to the 
literature on dynamic comparative advantage.  Policy implications for followers include 
maintaining open trade and foreign investment regimes, and encouraging R&D that would assist 
in catch-up with technological leaders.  Implications for leaders include transferring some of its 
consumers’ welfare gains into productivity-enhancing investments, ameliorating some of the 
strength of its original leadership loss. 23
Table 1.  Estimates of the value-added equation: Dependent variable: log of value-added per worker, 1993-2001 (Fixed effect) 
Independent variable  Estimates         
Log of capital per labor  0.226**        (18.99)   
Log of employment  -0.045**       (-4.46)
Country-specific intercepts:  Industry-specific intercepts:  Time-specific intercepts: 
Austria 8.910**    (44.61) 1511 -0.478**    (-9.42) 1993 -0.076 (-1.53)
Colombia 9.622**  (50.23) 1512 -0.540**     (-9.99) 1994 -0.072 (-1.49)
Cyprus 8.712**  (48.85) 1513 -0.608** (-11.71) 1995 -0.072 (-1.49)
Denmark 8.968**  (46.26) 1514 -0.110** (-2.16) 1996 -0.052 (-1.08)
Ecuador 7.281**  (39.29) 1520 -0.220** (-4.40) 1997 -0.022 (-0.46)
Eritrea 8.236**  (50.77) 1531 -0.204** (-3.99) 1998 -0.046 (-0.97)
Ethiopia 8.458**    (48.49) 1532 -0.104** (-1.49) 1999 -0.013 (-0.27)
Finland 8.930**  (46.65) 1533 -0.160** (-3.10) 2000 -0.036 (-0.77)
India 8.224**    (41.73) 1541 -0.515** (-9.18) 2001 (dropped)
Indonesia 7.973**  (40.57) 1542 -0.139** (-2.42) 
Iran 8.598**  (44.57) 1543 -0.294** (-5.27) 
Italy 9.107**    (43.16) 1544 -0.437** (-7.35) 
Japan 9.527**  (46.16) 1549 -0.294** (-5.29) 
Jordan 8.487**  (49.00) 1551 0.330** (5.66) 
Korea 9.515**    (47.03) 1552 -0.193** (-2.95) 
Malawi 7.031**    (36.39) 1553 0.532** (9.68) 
Malaysia 8.727**  (44.95) 1554 (dropped)  
Malta 8.798**  (50.67)  
Mexico 9.149**    (45.69)  
Mongolia 6.690**    (35.19)  
Norway 8.959**    (46.48)  
Oman 8.232**    (41.58)  
Panama 8.335**    (45.44)  
Portugal 8.493**    (43.60)  
Singapore 8.688**  (47.06)  
Spain 9.218**    (46.12)  
Thailand 8.459**    (40.88)  
Turkey 9.259**    (48.35)  
United Kingdom 9.271**    (45.09)  
United States  10.045**  (48.06)  
R
2                           0.998 
F test:  H0:  c      00 c bb =        ∀ F (29,2972)=148.55** Reject  H0
** indicates significance at 5%. 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistic of the coefficients.  
 Table 2.  Productivity leaders in 17 processed food industries 
Industry and ISIC code   Productivity leader  
1511  Processing/preserving of meat  United States  
1512  Processing/preserving of fish  United States 
1513  Processing/preserving of fruits and vegetables  United States  
1514  Vegetable and animal oils and fats  United States 
1520  Dairy products  United States  
1531  Grain mill products  United States  
1532  Starches and starch products  Spain 
1533  Prepared animal feeds  United States  
1541  Bakery products  Japan 
1542  Sugar  Korea 
1543  Cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery  Japan  
1544  Macaroni, noodle and similar products  Korea 
1549  Other food products n.e.c.  Mexico 
1551  Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits  United States 
1552  Wines  United States 
1553  Malt liquors and malt  United States 
1554  Soft drinks; mineral waters  United States 
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productivity relative to the leader over 1993-2001 
 








Log of productivity level in 1993: 
 
  












1514  Vegetable and animal oils and fats  -0.016 
(-1.58) 
 










1532  Starches and starch products  -0.082 
(-1.42) 
 















1543  Cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery  -0.066* 
(-1.76) 
0.095 
1544  Macaroni, noodle and similar products  -0.026 
(-0.74) 
 






























  ** indicates significance at 5%; * indicates significance at 10%. 
  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistic of the coefficients.  
  25Table 4.  Effects of productivity convergence 
 
4.a.  Wage equation: Dependent Variable: average growth rate of wage rate relative to the 
leader over 1993-2001 
 
Independent variable  Coefficient  t-stat 
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4.b.  Value-added-share equation: Dependent Variable: average growth rate of global 
value-added share over 1993-2001 
 
Independent variable  Coefficient  t-stat 
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  ** indicates significance at 5%.
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  29Appendix A.  Estimation of cross-country and –industry TFP levels in time series. 
For country c in industry i at time t, consider real value-added,  cit y , as a function of the real 
capital stock,  , and the level of employment,  : cit k cit l
9
(A.1)   ( , ) cit cit cit cit y fkl = . 
Under the assumption of Hicks-neutral technological differences over time and across countries, 
the function in equation (A.1) can be rewritten as: 
(A.2)   ( , ) cit cit cit cit cit y gkl =Ζ ⋅  
where  cit Z  is an index of TFP.  Assume the function   has a Cobb-Douglas form, 
therefore, an estimable form of equation (A.2) will be: 
( , ) cit cit cit gkl
(A.3)   01 2 ln ln ln cit cit cit cit y aa k a l =+ +  
or, subtracting l  from both sides:  n cit l
(A.4)   01 ln( / ) ln( / ) ln cit cit cit cit cit cit y laa k l l ρ =+ +  
where  12 1 aa ρ =+− .  Equation (A.4) indicates that value added per worker is a function of 
capital per worker and total employment.  The scale elasticity in equation (A.4) is given by 1 ρ + , 
whereρ  measures how far the value-added function deviates from constant returns to scale.  
Since TFP generally varies across countries and industries, and over time, the analysis of 
cross-country and –industry variation in value added per worker should allow for country-, 
industry-, and time-specific effects.  Therefore, the fixed-effect specification of equation (A.4) 
with country, industry, and time dummies is given by (Miller and Upadhyay, 2002):  
                                                 
9 Recall in our theoretical model, a country’s technological level is measured by its labor productivity ( / x l  or 
** / x l )  given the single factor of production – labor.  However, technological level will be measured empirically 
using total factor productivity (based on inputs of both capital and labor) rather than labor productivity since labor 
productivity does not allow the identification of separate influences of technology and capital growth (Bernard and 
Jones, 1996b).     
  30(A.5)   0001 ln( / ) ln( / ) ln cit cit c i t cit cit cit cit yl b bba kl l ρ ε =+++ + + 
where   is a country-specific intercept,   is an industry-specific intercept, and   is a time-
specific intercept.  As a result, the logarithm of TFP of country c in industry i at period t is given 
as 
0c b 0i b 0t b
l l
1 ln( / ) ln( / ) ln cit cit cit cit cit y la k l l ρ −− .   
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